Abstract
Introduction 42
Lumpy skin disease (LSD), sheep pox and goat pox are pox diseases of cattle, sheep and 43 goats, respectively. They are characterised by fever, nodules on the skin, internal lesions, 44 enlarged lymph nodes and sometimes death [1, 2, 3, 4] . The diseases are of economic 45 importance as they cause damage to hides and can result in death due to secondary bacterial 46 infections [2] together with resulting disruption of trade in livestock and livestock products 47 [1] . LSD can cause a temporary reduction in milk production in cattle and sterility in bulls [2] 48 with subsequent production impacts. The World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) has 49 categorised LSD and sheep pox and goat pox as notifiable diseases [4, 5] . 
54
Strains of sheep pox virus (SPPV), goat pox virus (GTPV) and lumpy skin disease virus 55 (LSDV) cannot be differentiated serologically [5] . There is close genetic relatedness of 56 capripoxvirus isolates, which average no less than 96% nucleotide identity between strains of 57 SPPV, GTPV and LSDV [1] .
58
LSD is currently present throughout most of the continent of Africa, with only Libya, 59 Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in the north still considered free [4] . It has spread out of the Greece (1988 Greece ( , 1995 Greece ( , 1996 Greece ( , 1997 Greece ( , 1998 Greece ( and 2000 and Bulgaria
76
(1995 and 1996) having spread from Turkey, probably in illegally imported animals [5] .
77
Spread of capripoxviruses can occur through trade of infected animals and their products 78 such as wool and hides [8] . Such products may be treated or untreated. Untreated hides and 79 skins are defined in Regulation (EU) No 142/2011 [9] as cutaneous and subcutaneous tissues 80 that have not undergone any treatment, other than cutting, chilling or freezing. There is 81 currently no requirement for treatment of these products imported to GB from within the EU.
82
Under Regulation (EU) No 142/2011 [9] 
Risk pathway

109
The risk pathway has four component steps: (i) the herd/flock from which an animal comes is 110 infected (with probability P 1 ), (ii) an individual animal is infected with the virus (with 111 probability P 2 ), given the herd/flock is infected, (iii) the infected skin/hide/wool bale enters 112 6 the export chain (with probability P 3 ), and (iv) the virus survives packaging and transport of 113 the skin/hide/wool to GB (with probability P 4 ). The probabilities P 2 , P 3 and P 4 are 114 conditional probabilities and the overall probability of virus entry (R) is given by: 
Levels of virus in wool from infected animals
147
There is little information on levels of SPPV or GPPV in wool. Following experimental 148 intradermal inoculation, the virus replicates in the cells of the dermis and glandular hair cells 149 at the base of the hair follicles [15] . Unlike skin, the virus will not be able to replicate within 150 the wool itself, and therefore any virus present will be due to contamination of the wool with woolless or sparsely wooled areas of skin [15] . However, the gross lesions were all over the 157 skin and in some internal organs in lambs [15] . It was assumed that wool from infected adult
158
sheep contains low levels of infectivity while wool from lambs contains medium levels of
infectivity. This reflects the fact that in some lambs lesions occur all over the skin rather than 160 in the woolless areas observed in adults.
162
Qualitative probabilities 163 The entry assessment describes the probability of entry of the virus into GB through the 164 importation of one product item from other regions of the EU. Following the European Food
165
Safety Authority (EFSA) definitions, the probabilities in Equation (1) The probability P 3 relates to the detection of an infected animal and therefore whether the infected 231 hide is prevented from being exported, rather than whether the animal was slaughtered for domestic 232 consumption or export. With reference to the risk question (see above) it is given that the hide has 233 been legally imported into GB and therefore comes from an EU farm registered to export where EU 234 142/2011 is enforced. The probability P 3 depends on the probability that an individual infected genomic copies was ~4-log 10 in normal skin in sheep at 6 dpi when macules faded on 258 exsanguination prior to necropsy [1] . Thus macule detection efficiency could be reduced at 259 slaughterhouses, while significant levels of virus are present in normal skin and in the 260 macules themselves. The macules enlarge and develop into papules within 1 to 2 days and 261 then to scabs within the following week [1] . Papules and scabs are less likely to be missed.
262
For LSDV-infected cattle, only half of those infected show symptoms (discussed above).
263
The probability P 3 is also related to the number of clinical cases in the flock/herd on the farm 
Results
293
On the basis of 2013/14 data for Greece and taking into account the number of sheep/goat 294 farms in Greece, it was concluded that the probability, P 1 , that a herd or flock is infected, is 295 low.
296
Assuming that the data for SPGP in Greece and Bulgaria [7] and LSD in Turkey 
318
Given that the SPGP/LSD virus in a hide/skin is unlikely to undergo significant decay within 319 the travel time to GB together with the medium initial titres of virus in normal skin of 320 infected sheep and goats, it was concluded that the probability of virus survival, P 4 , is high.
321
The individual probabilities and the overall probability R are given in Table 1 . The lowest 322 probability is for P 1 (low). Thus by combining the qualitative probabilities in Table 1 , using 323 the method described by Gale et al [18] , it was estimated that the overall probability, R, is 324 low. This represents the probability that an individual raw hide/skin or bale of wool is 
328
Descriptions of uncertainty and key assumptions are also presented in Table 1 for each 329 probability term. This process identifies that the risk assessment is highly dependent on the 330 data available from the SPGP outbreak in Greece and there is therefore uncertainty associated 331 with the estimate of risk of another EU country having an outbreak. It is therefore 332 recommended that this risk assessment is revisited if outbreaks occur elsewhere so that the 333 estimates for P 1 , P 2 and P 3 and hence the overall estimate of risk can be verified. Although there are quantitative data available for many of the parameters including P 1 , P 2 and P 4 , a 347 qualitative approach was adopted here because of the lack of any quantitative data for estimation of 348 infected cows has very low levels of virus [8] . Thus the capripoxvirus levels on an LSDV-367 infected cattle skin/hide given it has entered GB from the EU may be much lower than that 368 for SPGPV-infected hides.
369
The assessment did not consider the volume of trade in skins/hides/wool from the EU. Thus The method used to combine the qualitative probabilities associated with the risk of entry of 374 virus makes use of the fact that these probabilities are conditional; they correspond to a 375 sequential set of events, all of which are necessary for the importation of an infected product.
376
In a comparable quantitative assessment, the rules of probability mean that the conditional 377 probabilities are multiplied to give the joint probability which represents the estimate of risk.
378
The absolute maximum of this joint probability will be the minimum of the conditional 379 probabilities. It is intuitive to consider the same multiplicative process when dealing with 380 conditional probabilities that are qualitative. However, in this case, risk may be over-381 estimated because no account is taken of where on the qualitative category an individual 382 probability will lie. Furthermore, if all four probabilities P 1 to P 4 were low, for example, then 383 R would still be low as it would if three were high and just one were low. Thus, the low 384 estimate of virus entry may very well be an over-estimate in this case. As it currently stands, 385 the value of P 1 is the determining probability for R as it is the only probability with a value of Figure 1 ) and for LSD in cattle in Turkey (not shown). As discussed previously, this may 398 relate to some bias within the data due to failure to detect all of the infected animals within a 399 positive herd, particularly in the larger herds. However, using the approaches described above 400 for the combining of probabilities, only a significant decrease in the magnitude of P 2 (such 401 that P 2 is less than P 1 ) would affect the predicted value of R in this assessment. Under EU which meant fewer infected flocks had just one or two cases, would greatly decrease P 3 .
409
Indeed should P 3 decrease in magnitude below low, so too would R. While some 
417
In conclusion, based on the 2013/14 outbreak data for countries in south-east Europe, the 418 probability of entry of SPGPV into GB from the importation of a single hide/skin/wool bale 419 from an EU MS with ongoing outbreaks has been assessed as low. The predicted risk is also 
